ABSTRACT In this paper, we focus on the research of non-interactive secure multi-party computation. At first, we propose a fully homomorphic non-interactive verifiable secret sharing (FHNVSS) scheme. In this scheme, shareholders can generate shares of any-degree polynomials of shared numbers without interaction, and the dealer can verify the correctness of shares sent by shareholders without interaction. We implemented the FHNVSS scheme in Python with a detailed performance evaluation. According to our tests, the performance of FHNVSS is satisfactory. For instance, when the request is a 10-degree polynomial of secret value, generating a response takes about 0.0017263 s; verifying a response takes about 0.1221394 s; recovering a result takes about 0.0003862 s. Besides, we make an extension on the FHNVSS scheme to obtain a fully non-interactive secure multi-party computation, called AntNest. In the AntNest scheme, distrustful parties can jointly calculate a any-degree negotiated function, the inputs of which are inputs of all parties, without interaction, and each party can verify the correctness of responses sent by parties without interaction. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work to realize that parties can jointly calculate any-degree function, the inputs of which are inputs of all parties, without interaction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) [1] is a significant technology, where distrustful parties compute an agreed function of their inputs in a secure way. Even if some malicious parties cheat, MPC can guarantee the correctness of output as well as the privacy of parties' inputs.
There is a long-term problem that all existing informationtheoretic secure MPCs have large round and communication complexity [2] - [13] . In these constructions, it is the case that multiplication gates require communication to be processed (while addition/linear gates usually do not). In CRYPTO 2016, Damgård et al. [3] proposed that the number of rounds should be at least the (multiplicative) depth of the circuit, and the communication complexity is O(ns) for a circuit of size s (n and s are the number of participants and the number of multiplication gates respectively).
Specifically, the issue of round and communication complexity existed because all such protocols follow the same typical ''gate-by-gate'' design pattern [3] : Parties work through an arithmetic (boolean) circuit on secretly shared inputs, such that after they execute a sub-protocol that processes a gate, the output of gate is represented as a new secret sharing among these parties. In particular, a Multiplication Gate Protocol (MGP) basically takes random shares of two values a, b from a field as input and random shares of ab as output.
In this paper, we mainly focus on non-interactive secure MPC, where parties can jointly calculate homomorphic multiplications and additions on shared numbers without interaction. More details, in our proposed scheme, distrusted parties can joint calculate an any-degree negotiated polynomial, the inputs of which are inputs of all parties, without interaction, and each party can verify the correctness of the output without interaction.
A. OUR RESULTS

Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We present a fully non-interactive verifiable secret sharing (FHNVSS) scheme. In the scheme, shareholders can generate shares of any-degree polynomial of shared numbers without interaction, and the dealer can verify the correctness of shares sent by shareholders without interaction. A security analysis of FHNVSS scheme is presented.
• We present detailed performance evaluation of FHNVSS scheme by deploying it on a Ubuntu 16.04 environment laptop in Python. According to our tests, the performance of FHNVSS is satisfactory. For instance, when the request is a 10-degree polynomial of shared numbers, generating a response takes about 0.0017263 s; verifying a response takes about 0.1221394 s; recovering a result takes about 0.0003862 s.
• We propose a Fully Non-interactive Secure Multi-party Computation, called AntNest. In this AntNest scheme, distrustful parties can jointly calculate an any-degree negotiated function, the input of which are inputs of all parties, without interaction, and they can verify correctness of responses sent by other parties without interaction. A security analysis of AntNest is given. The two proposed schemes can be applied in confidential computing scenarios to protect user's privacy. For instance, the FHNVSS scheme can be applied in confidential outsourced computing or cloud computing, where servers can help some user process encrypted data according to the user's request without obtaining plaintext data. Besides, the AntNest scheme can be applied in confidential data sharing, where multi-parties hope to jointly calculate inputs of all parties without leaking inputs of each party. [14] Recently, in [14] , we proposed a secure multi-party computation scheme, where shareholders can generate shares of twodegree polynomials of secret numbers without interaction. Temporarily, the secure MPC scheme proposed in [14] is called Pre-Scheme, and it has the following limitations:
1) COMPARISONS WITH
• Servers (shareholders) can only generate shares of twodegree polynomial of secret numbers. In other words, servers cannot get any shares of k-degree (k > 2) polynomial of secret numbers.
• Pre-Scheme used the pairing (pairing is an expensive computation) to verify the correctness of responses (these responses are shares of two-degree polynomial of secret numbers) sent by servers.
• Reference [14] did not include a complete security analysis of Pre-Scheme. Compared with the Pre-Scheme, improvements of AntNest are as follows:
-Theoretically, distrustful parties can jointly calculate any-degree negotiated function, the input of which are inputs of all parties, without interaction. -Each party can verify other parties compute honestly.
In this verification process, AntNest does not use pairing to verify responses of parties, while Pre-Scheme used. -We will present a complete security analysis of AntNest. Moreover, this proof is also valid for the Pre-Scheme [14] .
2) ORGANIZATION
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec.II, related work is given. An overview of FHNVSS and AntNest is shown in Sec.III. Sec.IV briefly presents preliminaries. We introduce the FHNVSS scheme without verifiability and the verifiability of FHNVSS in Sec.V-A and Sec.V-B, respectively. A detailed performance evaluation is shown in Sec.VI. The construction of AntNest is studied in Sec.VII. The security analysis of FHNVSS and AntNest is discussed in Sec.VIII. Finally, a short conclusion is presented in Sect.IX.
II. RELATED WORK
The round complexity and communication complexity of secure MPC have been two fundamental issues in cryptography. There are many studies about these two aspects. In this subsection, we will present related work about our study at first, then some comparisons between our previous paper [14] and this paper will be presented.
A. ROUND COMPLEXITY
The round complexity of an ordered gate-by-gate protocol must be at least proportional to the multiplicative depth of the circuit [5] . The work of constant-round protocols for MPC was initially studied by Beaver et al. [15] . Subsequently, a long sequence of works constructed constant-round MPCs (e.g., 2-round [4] , [13] , [16] , [17] , 3-round [18] , 4-round [5] , [10] , [19] , 5-round [6] , [20] , [21] and 6-round [20] ). In particular, in Eurocrypt 2004, Katz and Ostrovsky [21] established the exact round complexity of secure two-party computation with respect to blackbox proofs of security. In CRYPTO 2015, Ostrovsky et al. [10] provided a 4-round secure two-party computation protocol based on any enhanced trapdoor permutation, and Ishai et al. [13] obtained several results on the existence of 2-round MPC protocols over secure point-to-point channels, without broadcast or any additional setup. In EUROCRYPT 2017, Garg et al. [6] proposed several 5-rounds protocols by assuming quasi-polynomially-hard injective one-way functions (or 7 rounds assuming standard polynomially-hard collision-resistant hash functions). However, our scheme can solve any request of any-degree polynomial of secret numbers in 1-round.
B. COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY
Initially, Gennaro et al. [22] proposed that: To securely compute a multiplication of two secretly shared elements from a finite field based on one communication round, parties have to exchange O(n 2 ) field elements since each of n parties must perform Shamir's secret sharing as part of the protocol. After that, Cramer et al. [23] In a fully homomorphic non-interactive verifiable secret sharing (FHNVSS) scheme, components include a dealer and a certain number of shareholders (servers). A (t, n) FHNVSS scheme works as follows:
• Step 1: The dealer generates n core-shares and a verification key (VK). After that, he opens VK, then anyone (including servers) can verify whether VK is correctly computed by dealer. If VK is invalid, then the dealer has to regenerate the core-shares and VK, else the participants join in the next step.
•
Step 2: The dealer secretly sends these n core-shares to n servers respectively. In this process, core-shares are encrypted with corresponding public keys. After receiving a core-share, a server can verify whether his coreshare is valid by using VK. If the server's core-share is invalid, then he can ignore it and ask dealer to resend a core-share to him.
• Step 3: The dealer encrypts secret numbers into encrypted numbers, then he sends the encrypted numbers to servers.
• Step 4: When the dealer needs to get a result that is a polynomial of secret numbers, he will send a query to n servers.
• Step 5: According to the query sent by dealer, an active server will independently generate a response with his core-share (this process has no interaction with other servers), then the server will send his response to dealer securely.
Step 6: After receiving responses, the dealer can verify whether responses are correctly computed by corresponding servers. These verifications do not need interaction with other servers. If a response is invalid, then the dealer can ignore this response or ask the corresponding server to resend a response to him. Finally, the dealer can recover the desired result if he can collect at least t correct responses. The FHNVSS scheme mainly has the following features:
• Full homomorphism. Servers can perform efficient homomorphic additions and multiplications on encrypted numbers without decrypting them.
• Confidentiality. Secret numbers shared by dealer are always confidential as long as less than t servers are malicious.
• Verifiability. Verification key, core-shares and responses are verifiable.
-Verification key. When the verification key (VK) is opened, anyone can verify its validity.
-Core-shares. When a server receives a core-share, he can verify whether this core-share is correctly computed by the dealer. Moreover, in this method, the malicious dealer and incorrect core-shares can be checked out. -Responses. When the dealer gets a response sent by a server, the dealer would verify whether this response is correctly computed by the server. In this way, malicious servers and incorrect responses can be checked out. By making an extension on the (t, n) FHNVSS scheme, t > 2, we obtain a (t, n) AntNest scheme, where n parties can jointly calculate a negotiated function, the input of which are numbers shared by all parties. Each party independently works as a dealer of (t, n) FHNVSS scheme to share his inputs among the n parties, and he also works as a server of (t, n) FHNVSS scheme to jointly compute the negotiated function. The work process of a (t, n) AntNest scheme is as follows:
• Step 1: Each party executes a (t, n) FHNVSS scheme independently. He generates n core-shares and a verification key (VK). In these n core-shares, one core-share belongs to this party, and other n − 1 will be sent to other n − 1 parties respectively in the next step. Each party opens his VK. Anyone (including other parties) can verify whether the VK is correctly computed by its generator. If a VK is invalid, its generator has to regenerate his VK. Once all VKs are valid, all parties join in the next step.
• Step 2: Each party secretly sends his n − 1 core-shares (except his own core-share) to other n − 1 servers respectively. After receiving a core-share, each party can verify whether this core-share is correctly computed by the sender via sender's VK. If a core-share is invalid, the receiver can ignore it and request corresponding sender to re-send it. Once all core-shares are valid, all parties join in the next step.
• Step 3: Each party encrypts his input into encrypted numbers, then he broadcasts these encrypted numbers.
• Step 4: Parties negotiate a function, which will be jointly calculated by parties. Inputs of the negotiated function are inputs of all parties.
• Step 5: According to the negotiated function, each party can generate a response with his core-shares and encrypted numbers shared by parties, then he broadcasts his response.
• Step 6: After receiving a response, each party can verify whether this response is correctly computed via this sender's VK. This verification process does not need interaction. If a party receives an invalid response, then he can ignore it or request the corresponding party to re-send it.
• Once a party collects at least t valid responses, he will recover the correct result of negotiated function. VOLUME 6, 2018
IV. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we hope to present basic cryptography techniques of AntNest and the adversary model.
A. SHAMIR'S SECRET SHARING
Alice wants to secretly share a secret value s with n participants, and arbitrary t of the n participants can recover s, but less than t participants cannot get anything. In order do this, Alice needs to generate n shares of s, then secretly sends the n shares to the n participants respectively. After that, if someone can collect at least t correct shares, then he can recover the secret value s. This problem can be resolved by Shamir's (t, n) secret sharing (SSS) [24] . In this subsection, we will present the working process of the SSS. Firstly, Alice randomly samples a polynomial f (x) of degree t-1 from F p [x] (p is a big prime number) as the following polynomial:
where s is the secret value as well as a 1 
Secondly, let P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n be the n participants and ID i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) denote P i 's address. Alice generates P i 's share as follow:
where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then, Alice secretly sends Share 1 , Share 2 , . . . , Share n to the n participants, respectively.
Finally, if someone collects t correct shares, then he can use the lagrange interpolation to reconstruct the polynomial f (x). Without loss of generality, let the t shares be Share 1 , Share 2 , . . . , Share t . He can reconstruct the polynomial f (x) as follow:
Consequently, he can get s = f (0).
1) ADDITION HOMOMORPHISM OF SSS
SSS naturally has the additional homomorphism. It means that the sum of shares is the share of the sum of corresponding secrets. Moreover, the threshold number is always immutable during this process since the degree of the sum of shared polynomials is equal to the degree of shared polynomials. Therefore, if a dealer can collect threshold number of sum shares, he can reconstruct the corresponding polynomial and then get the sum of secrets. Consequently, SSS naturally has the additional homomorphism.
2) MULTIPLICATION HOMOMORPHISM OF SSS
Similarly, SSS naturally also has the multiplicative homomorphism. It denotes that the product of shares is the share of the product of corresponding secrets. However, the multiplicative homomorphism has a big limitation that is, with the degree growth of product of secrets, the degree result polynomial will become larger and larger. Under this process, it will eventually arrive at a threshold larger than n so that the final result cannot be reconstructed. Finally, the multiplicative homomorphism of SSS is restricted.
B. PAIRING
In AntNest, the pairing computation is only used in the verification process of verification key. After that, pairing will not be used anymore. Namely, it however will not be used in the verification processes of core-shares and responses. Let G and G T be the cyclic groups of a large prime order q. G is the generator of G. A cryptography pairing [25] e (bilinear map): G× G → G T is a map that has a property of bilinearity. The bilinearity means that
where a, b ∈ Z q . Remark 1: In the proposed scheme, pairing is only used in verifying VK.
C. ADVERSARY MODEL
In this subsection, we present the adversary models of FHN-VSS and AntNest.
In a (t, n) FHNVSS scheme, which includes a dealer and n shareholders, we have the following assumptions:
• The dealer could generate the verification key (VK) and core-shares dishonestly, but he does not reveal any secret data to servers.
• A server could generate a response dishonestly, but the number of dishonest parties is less than t. In a (t, n) AntNest scheme, t > 2, which includes n parties, we have the following assumptions:
• An honest party honestly generates the verification key (VK), core-shares and responses, and he does not reveal any his private data to other parties.
• A malicious party could generates the verification key (VK), core-shares and responses dishonestly, and he could reveal his private data to other parties.
V. FULLY HOMOMORPHIC NON-INTERACTIVE VERIFIABLE SECRET SHARING SCHEME
In this section, we will present a fully homomorphic noninteractive verifiable secret sharing (FHNVSS) scheme.
To clearly present the work process of FHNVSS, we will present the FHNVSS scheme without verifiability at first. Then we will give out the verifiability of FHNVSS. Finally, basic applications of FHNVSS combined with blockchain will be illustrated.
A. FHNVSS WITHOUT VERIFIABILITY
In this subsection, we will present the FHNVSS without verifiability, where data-senders (dealer and servers) are all honest. Namely, all data-recepients (servers and dealer) do not need to verify data received. While, in the next section, we will specifically show the verification processes of FHNVSS, where the dealer and servers could be dishonest, and a (t, n) FHNVSS will be taken as an example to present the scheme without verifiability. A FHNVSS scheme contains a dealer and n servers. The work process of full FHNVSS scheme is shown in Fig.1 . Let Sr i denote the i-th server and ID i be the ID of Sr i . The work process of FHNVSS is as follows:
Step 1 (Generate Core-Shares): Dealer randomly samples f 1 (x), f 2 (x), . . . , f k (x), which are (t − 1)-degree polynomials over F q as follows:
i from 1 to n, dealer computes core-share for server Sr i as follows:
Step 2 (Send Core-Shares): i = 1, 2, . . . , n, the dealer encrypts core-share i with Sr i 's public key and then sends encrypted core-share i to Sr i .
Step 3 (Send Request): Assume that the dealer wants to get the result V = k i=0 b i s i . Therefore, he will send a request to n servers, then servers will generate responses for him. Specifically, the request includes the following numbers:
According to the request, a server will know that the dealer wants to get k i=1 b i s i + b 0 , but the server does not know the secret value s.
Step 4 (Generate Responses): If Sr i is willing to respond the request, he will use his core-share i to generate a response Resp i as follow:
Then, Sr i sends Resp i to the dealer secretly.
Step 
1) FHNVSS WITH SHARING ENCRYPTED NUMBERS
The dealer has a set of secret numbers that are d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d m , which will be shared with servers. After randomly sampling f 1 (x) as mentioned in Eq.1, the dealer performs as follows: d m into a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m as follows:
• Generate core-shares (core-share 1 , core-share 2 , . . ., core-share k ) as mentioned in Sec.V-A.
• Secretly sending core-share i to Sr i , i from 1 to n.
• Open a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m . After that, the dealer can send a request about the numbers
For instance, a request may be as follow:
, where X j denotes the secret number d j , but it does not expose d j . Then servers can generate corresponding responses according to the request. According to this request and encrypted numbers, a server will generate a response with this request, encrypted numbers and his core-share. Next, we will present how dealer and servers work with a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m .
At first, assume that: i) the maximum degree of addressable request is k, ii) the dealer has secretly sent core-share i to Sr i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and iii) he has also opened encrypted numbers {a 1 , a 2 
At this moment, the polynomial W (x) can be seen as the request mentioned in Sec.V-A. Therefore, servers can use W (x) to generate responses. The work processes of generating responses, verifying responses and recovering result are the same as the corresponding work processes mentioned in Sec.V-A.
B. VERIFIABILITY OF FHNVSS
In Sec.V-A, we described the FHNVSS without verification, and we assumed that data-senders (dealer and servers) are honest. However, in practical applications, data-senders might incorrectly compute data which would lead to the corresponding data-recepients generates wrong results. Therefore, data-recepients (servers or dealer) should verify whether received data (core-shares or responses) are correctly computed by corresponding data-senders. In this way, malicious data-senders and incorrect data can be checked out. Therefore, in this section, we will present how data-recepients verify received data. Specifically, compared with the FHNVSS without verifiability mentioned in Sec.V-A, the full FHNVSS scheme adds four parts: (i) the dealer generates and opens the verification key (VK); (ii) anyone can verify the correctness of VK; (iii) the server can verify the correctness of his core-share; (iv) the dealer can verify the correctness of responses sent by servers.
We take the (t, n) FHNVSS as an example to present the work process of verification. The (t, n) FHNVSS scheme contains a dealer and n servers, and servers can respond at most k-degree request. Let Sr 1 , Sr 2 , . . . , Sr n denote the n servers. Furthermore, the dealer can recover the desired result if at least t servers generate valid responses to the dealer. Moreover, ID i is the ID of Sr i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Furthermore, let g denote a generator of a cyclic group. We will use g a to compute a commitment of a to hide a. In the next text, we will present how to verify verification key (VK), core-shares and responses.
1) VERIFY VERIFICATION KEY
Before the dealer sends the core-shares to servers, he would generates a verification key (VK) that will be used in the future verifications. The VK is constructed as follows:
• The dealer randomly samples f 1 
as mentioned in Eq.1
• Let CM {f (x)} denote the commitments of coefficients of f (x). For instance, when f (x) = w 3 x 3 +w 2 x 2 +w 1 x+w 0 , then
• The verification key (VK) is as follow:
Let CM X denote a commitment of X , which is a scalar. 
2) VERIFY CORE-SHARES
Assume that the VK is valid and has been opened. The coreshare of Sr i is as follow:
Because commitments of coefficients of f 1 (x), f 2 (x), . . . , f k (x) have been provided in VK as well as VK is valid, so Sr i can verify his core-share i with VK and ID i . j from 1 to k, if the following equation holds, then the f j (ID i ) is valid.
3) VERIFY RESPONSES
In (t, n) FHNVSS, the dealer can verify whether a response is correctly computed by the corresponding server. In this subsection, we will take the case of request being According to Sec.V-A, we know
Consequently, the dealer can verify the Resp i as follows:
ID r i CM s j .
• j = 1, 2, . . . , k, if the following equation holds, then the response Resp i is valid.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF FHNVSS
In this section, we will present a performance evaluation of FHNVSS by deploying it on a Ubuntu 16.04 environment laptop. Specifically, the FHNVSS was implemented in Python on a two core of a 2.60GHz Intel(R) Core (TM) i7-6500U CPU with 8G RAM. We used high-speed PairingBased Cryptography (PBC) library [26] to compute point multiplication of elliptic curve and pairing, and utilized GNU Multiple Precision (GMP) Arithmetic Library [27] to calculate big number computation. In the our experiments, FHNVSS was divided into seven algorithms:
(Gen_VK, Ver_VK, Gen_CS, Ver_CS, Gen_resp, Ver_resp, Recover).
These algorithms are used as follows:
• Gen_VK: Dealer uses Gen_VK to generate verification key (VK).
• Ver_VK: Servers can use Ver_VK to verify the validation of VK.
• Gen_CS: Dealer uses Gen_CS to generate core-shares for servers.
• Ver_CS: Servers can use Ver_CS and VK to verify coreshares sent by dealer.
• Gen_Resp: Servers can use Gen_Resp to generate responses according to the request sent by dealer.
• Ver_Resp: Dealer can use Ver_Resp and VK to verify the validation of responses sent by servers.
• Recover: Dealer can use Recover to recover desired result with the threshold number of valid responses. In practical applications, these functions belong to different participants (dealer and servers). The affiliation of these functions is shown in Table 1 . We performed two types of tests as follows:
• Test 1: We deployed (3,7) FHNVSS (a total 7 servers, and the desired result can be recovered with at least 3 valid responses) on our laptop. Let k be the largest degree of addressable request, we set k from 4 to 10. We tested the performance of Gen_core-share, Gen_VK, Ver_core-share and Ver_VK. The results of Test 1 are shown in Table 2 .
• Test 2: We also deployed (3,7) FHNVSS on our laptop. Let the largest degree of addressable request be constant 10. We set the degree of request from 2 to 10. We tested the performance of Rec_result, Gen_response and Ver_response. The results of Test 2 are shown in Table 3 .
VII. AntNest
In this section, we will make an extension on (t, n) (t > 2) FHNVSS to obtain a fully non-interactive multi-party computation scheme, called AntNest. In a (t, n) AntNest scheme, n parties jointly compute a negotiated function, the inputs of which are inputs of all parties, and honest party does not reveal his own private data (include his inputs) to others. Because the MPC scheme AntNest is based on FHNVSS, properties of non-interactive and verifiability are same as FHNVSS. That is to say, parties can jointly compute with inputs of all parties without interaction; parties can verify VK, core-shares and responses without interaction. The construction of AntNest will be presented first, then we will discuss the security of AntNest.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF AntNest
A (t, n) AntNest scheme includes n parties (n ≥ t > 2). Each party works as a dealer of (t, n) FHNVSS to confidentially share his data with other parties, and he also works as a server of FHNVSS to jointly compute a function negotiated VOLUME 6, 2018 by parties, the inputs of which are data shared by all parties.
In the following content, we will take a (t, n) AntNest as an example to present the work process of the scheme. Let these n parties be P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n .
• Step 1: i from 1 to n, P i executes a (t, n) FUNVSS scheme among the n parties independently. In this process all n parties act as n servers of this (t, n) FUNVSS scheme and the key secret sampled by P i is s i . Specifically, P i executes algorithms Gen_VK and Gen_CS to generate a verification key (VK i ) and n core-shares (CS i,1 , CS i,2 , . . . , CS i,n ) respectively. He opens the VK i and securely sends CS i,j (j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j = i) to P j , and he securely keeps the CS i,i . The VK i can be verified by other parties with the algorithm Ver_VK.
If VK i is invalid, P i has to re-generate this VK i . CS i,j can be verified by P j with the algorithm Ver_CS. If CS i,j is invalid, P j can request P i to re-send a CS i,j until a valid core-share is received. Once each party opens a valid verification key and sends valid core-shares to other parties, they join in the next step.
Step 2: i from 1 to n, P i uses his secret numbers (n i,1 , n i,2 , . . . , n i,m i ) to generates his encrypted numbers (encn i,1 , encn i,2 , . . . , encn i,m i ) by computing
and sends them to other parties. These numbers are as P i 's inputs of the function negotiated by parties in the next step.
• Step 3: These n parties negotiate a function, which will be jointly calculated by them. The inputs of this function are secret numbers shared by parties. The function is a sum of n polynomials as follow:
where g j is a polynomial of n j,1 , n j,2 , . . . , n j,m j .
Step 4: i from 1 to n, j from 1 to n, according to the formula g j in the negotiated function, P i executes the algorithm Gen_Resp to generate a response (ID i ) . After that, the party multiples these commitments to obtain a commitment as follow:
If CM final,i = g Resp i , the response Resp i is valid, else the party can request the corresponding party re-send a response until a valid response is received.
• Step 6: Once a party collects at least t valid responses, he can use Lagrangian Interpolation to recover a polynomial H (x). Then the correct result of negotiated function is equal to H (x)| x=0 .
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will discuss the security of the proposed two schemes, FHNVSS and AntNest.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF FHNVSS
In this subsection, we will take the (t, n) FHNVSS as an example to discuss the security of the proposed FHNVSS. In this discussion, the maximum degree of polynomial that the dealer can query is k. The FHNVSS scheme is based on the Shamir's secret sharing (SSS) scheme [24] . In the SSS scheme, an honest shareholder does not reveal his share to anyone. However, a malicious shareholder reveals his share to other malicious shareholders. Thereby, malicious shareholders work collusively. In a (t, n) SSS scheme, the secret value would not be revealed as long as the number of malicious shareholders is less than t. Similarly, in the FHNVSS scheme, an honest server does not reveal his core-shares to anyone. However, a malicious server reveals his core-shares to other malicious servers. Thereby, malicious servers work collusively. Next, we will prove that the key secret value s, in a (t, n) FHNVSS scheme, would not be revealed as long as the number of malicious servers is less than t.
According to Sec.V-A, the secretly shared polynomials among servers are as follows:
Malicious servers do not know any thing except that f 1 (x), f 2 (x), f 3 (x), . . . , f k (x) are (t − 1)-degree polynomials. For instance, these polynomials are expressed as the follows: Next, we will prove that t − 1 malicious servers cannot solve the secret value s with their core-shares, although they work jointly. Without loss of generality, we assume that Sr 1 , Sr 2 , . . . , Sr t−1 are the t − 1 malicious servers as well as other servers are honest. According to Sec.V-A, we know that the core-share kept by Table 4 .
In order to solve coefficients of f 1 (x), f 2 (x), f 3 (x), . . . , f k (x), the t − 1 malicious servers can construct linear 75646 VOLUME 6, 2018 equations by using their core-shares as follows: In a word, s is always un-determined, and the t − 1 malicious servers cannot recover the key secret value s although they jointly work together.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF AntNest
In this subsection, we will discuss the security of (t, n) AntNest. Similar to FHNVSS, in the AntNest scheme, an honest party does not reveal his inputs and core-shares to anyone. However, a malicious party reveals his inputs and core-shares to other malicious parties. Thereby, malicious servers work collusively. Next, we will discuss the security of inputs.
• The confidentiality of inputs without considering the result of negotiated function. P i 's inputs are shared among P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n via a (t, n) FHNVSS. A party can recover P i 's inputs iff he can get at least t valid coreshares of P i such as (CS i,1 , CS i,2 , . . . , CS i,t ). However, this party cannot obtain these core-shares as long as the number of malicious parties is less than t. Particularly, in a special case (n, n) FHNVSS scheme, a party can recover P i 's inputs iff he can get all core-shares (CS i,1 , CS i,2 , . . . , CS i,n ). However, this party cannot get CS i,i as long as P i does not reveal it. Therefore, in a (n, n) FHNVSS scheme, inputs of P i are always secure and confidential iff he does not reveal his CS i,i others.
• The confidentiality of inputs in the case of considering result of negotiated function. An honest party does not reveal his inputs to anyone. A malicious party reveals his inputs and core-shares to other malicious parties. Thereby, malicious parties work collusively. Next, we will take an example to discuss the confidentiality of inputs. In other examples, the principle is similar. The example is that: the number of parties is 8 and they are P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P 8 ; the input of P i is x i (i = 1, 2, . . . , 8); the negotiated function is result = x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 + x 5 + x 6 + x 7 + x 8 .
-The number of honest parties is one. Without loss of generality, we assume that P 1 is honest and other 7 parties (P 2 , . . . , P 8 ) are malicious. Although P 1 does not reveal his input x 1 , the malicious parties can also obtain x 1 by using the following equation:
x 1 = result − (x 2 + x 3 + x 4 + x 5 + x 6 + x 7 + x 8 ).
Thereby, in this case, P 1 's input is not secure and confidential. -The number of honest parties is two. Without loss of generality, we assume that P 1 , P 2 are honest and other 6 parties (P 3 , . . . , P 8 ) are malicious.
Malicious parties can obtain a number as follow:
x 1 + x 2 = result − (x 3 + x 4 + x 5 + x 6 + x 7 + x 8 ).
Because P 1 , P 2 do not reveal their inputs x 1 , x 2 , malicious parties cannot solve out x 1 , x 2 from result − (x 3 + x 4 + x 5 + x 6 + x 7 + x 8 ). Thereby, if P 1 , P 2 do not reveal x 1 , x 2 , x 1 , x 2 are secure and confidential. VOLUME 6, 2018 -The number of honest parties is more than two. Without loss of generality, we assume that P 1 , P 2 , P 3 are honest and other 5 parties (P 4 , . . . , P 6 ) are malicious. Malicious parties can obtain a number as follow:
x 1 + x 2 + x 3 = result − (x 4 + x 5 + x 6 + x 7 + x 8 ).
Because P 1 , P 2 , P 3 do not reveal their inputs x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , malicious parties cannot solve out x 1 , x 2 , x 3 from result − (x 4 + x 5 + x 6 + x 7 + x 8 ). Therefore, if P 1 , P 2 , P 3 do not reveal x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 are secure and confidential. According to the above discussions, inputs of honest parties are secure and confidential if the number of honest parties is more than one.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a fully homomorphic noninteractive verifiable secret sharing (FHNVSS) scheme. In this scheme, shareholders can generate shares of anydegree polynomial of shared numbers without interaction, and the dealer can verify whether shareholders are honest without interaction. We implemented the FHNVSS scheme in Python with a detailed performance evaluation. Besides, we make an extension on the FHNVSS scheme to obtain a fully non-interactive secure multi-party computation, called AntNest, where distrustful parties can jointly calculate an any-degree negotiated function, the input of which are inputs of all parties, without interaction, and each party can verify whether other parties calculate honestly without interaction.
